The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was effectively created to provide emergency loans to countries in crisis. Yet the United States predominantly fulfilled the role of an international lender of last resort (ILLR). McDowell explains the conditions under which the US provides bailouts to countries and highlights US economic interests as a key driver for emergency loan provision. He argues that changing structures in the international financial system during the 1980s and 1990s surfaced two fundamental weaknesses of the IMF as an ILLR: the lack of sufficient resources and the inability to act swiftly in crisis situations. When vital US economic interests are threatened and the IMF fails to act upon them, US policymakers provide money via both the Federal Reserve and the US Treasury using currency swaps with foreign central banks.
Although the quantitative analyses are rather secondary and take only a subordinate role, they still support the argument that the protection of private banks' financial interests in the respective economy and the stability of the national financial system are the main determinants for US bailout decisions. Owing to his strong and comprehensive historical account, McDowell substantiates these findings by elaborating on a variety of different case studies. The combination of diverse cases convincingly underlines this argument and offers ample opportunities for future research on the conditions for and against bailouts -especially for cases not explained by his argument.
The results emphasise the important, though often disregarded, role of the US as an ILLR. With regard to the 2007 financial crisis, McDowell stresses his objection to prevailing criticism on America's current capacity as an ILLR. Even though it proves strong in its historical accountability up to the twenty-first century, it remains to be seen to what extent these claims are warranted in, for instance, Europe's economy with potentially imminent bailout decisions.
Future research is thus well-advised not only to take McDowell's arguments into account but also to validate their applicability to current financial relations. His novel view on international crisis management introduces insightful aspects, which are also relevant to related fields. The study unites research on US economic policy strategies and IMF loan disbursement to a powerful and convincing analysis of crisis management since the end of World War II. Thanks to his ability to simplify complex economic structures as well as the plain yet easy to understand writing, he also invites an audience beyond academics to the topic.
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